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INTRODUCTION
At a recent press conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton summarized the current challenge the United States faces regarding the piracy situation off the Horn of Africa (HOA), "we may be dealing with a 17th Century crime, but we need to bring 21 st Century assets to bear." 1 Although debate exists among industry experts regarding the impact that HOA piracy has on global commerce, there is consensus that nations ignore the negative effects at their own peril. The recently-formed U.S. Department of State organization, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), described the impact of piracy in the HOA region in the following manner; "piracy disrupts critical humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia, increases shipping insurance premiums along one of the world"s most traveled routes to near-prohibitive levels, damages littoral economies by forcing the diversion of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and raises the prospect of environmental disaster as ships fall prey to hostile intent." 2 Reports of multi-million dollar ransom payments along with dramatic increases in the rate of HOA piracy may lead a reasonable person to believe that the combined efforts of the U. S. government (USG) along with the international community are not having a significant effect in spite of considerable effort at all levels. These counter-piracy efforts range from the creation of multiple international maritime task forces to the passage of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Although these initiatives are a good start, Command (AFRICOM), became fully operational. With the expressed intent to present a united front to deal with African issues 4 , the establishment of AFRICOM is a positive sign that the U.S. government recognizes the importance of addressing issues on the continent.
This command has not yet, however, issued a coherent counter-piracy policy. This is in spite of solid national-level guidance and numerous successful international accords that could be utilized to help build theater-level strategy.
An effective long-term solution to piracy must ultimately blend all aspects of U.S. This paper will focus on how the nature of the HOA piracy problem compels a response involving all aspects of national power. Specific areas of focus include the current status of and potential shortfalls in: counter-piracy doctrine, international law, national strategy, theater-level policies, and the interagency process. This paper will conclude with recommendations for AFRICOM leadership to improve current policies.
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

HOA PIRACY THREAT
The strategic importance of the HOA region highlights the ramifications that a disruption in trade, such as that posed by piracy, may have on the world-wide economy.
Global commerce depends on the 20,000 ships that travel annually through the region carrying approximately 12 percent of the world"s oil supply. 7 Another significant aspect is the growing economic relevance of the African continent. In 2007, African countries accounted for more U.S. petroleum imports than the Persian Gulf region.
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The rapidly increasing rate of attacks along with an assessed potential for HOA piracy"s future development into a significant transnational threat are just two reasons why AFRICOM must address the problem now. One potential pitfall for building regional security capability is the weak condition of the Somali central government. This does not mean that the Somalis are not willing to help.
The current Somali President, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, recently described plans to establish a 10,000 member security force to combat the pirates. 27 AFRICOM planners, however, must be wary of committing precious assets to a government that has not demonstrated effective control outside of the Somali capital city of Mogadishu.
Another prospective shortfall for counter-piracy efforts on land is an over-dependence on military power. An associate professor at the Naval War College, James Holmes recently wrote an editorial arguing against implementing significant efforts ashore in Somalia. 
THEATER-LEVEL STRATEGY
One of the most significant shortfalls in AFRICOM"s theater counter-piracy effort is its near-total lack of integration with the current CENTCOM anti-piracy maritime task force, Another issue that AFRICOM planners must address is an apparent disconnect between national and theater objectives regarding piracy. In a March 2009 posture statement, AFRICOM"s leadership lists two of its strategic goals as "African countries and organizations (that) are able to provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent" and to "improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states." 43 The apparent lack of AFRICOM counter-piracy focus is surprising. This lack of emphasis was further highlighted when officials from one of AFRICOM"s subordinate commands, 
CONCLUSIONS
The JIATF construct presents a viable C2 structure for AFRICOM leadership. The nature of the piracy problem (legal challenges, interaction with foreign governments, the need for industry cooperation, etc.) requires expertise resident outside of the Defense Department, yet the Defense Department"s significant resource advantage over other USG agencies makes it a logical candidate to organize the interagency effort. Due to similarities between AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM mission sets, JIATF-SOUTH provides a great example of a JIATF construct for AFRICOM to use when analyzing its own counter-piracy mission.
One of the most significant issues that AFRICOM must resolve in future counterpiracy efforts is the disconnect between AFRICOM and CENTCOM regarding C2 of CTF 151. Currently, AFRICOM does not seem to have any direct involvement with forces tasked to patrol the waters in the HOA region. This lack of coordination is dangerous as it facilitates the possible violation of the critical principle of war, unity of command.
Although debate continues on the extent of the piracy threat, most analysts agree that affected governments must address the issue as a matter of national security. The negative impact that piracy has on global commerce dictates a concerted response from the U.S. power. This solution must also address previously discussed piracy enablers, such as public support and recruit availability. Many components of this solution will come from various USG agencies, but AFRICOM must coordinate them if it wants to avoid losing one of its first significant challenges to theater security.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The current AFRICOM organization, CJTF-HOA, is a perfect candidate for conversion into a counter-piracy focused JIATF. CJTF-HOA has already established a footprint in the region, and has declared one of its focus areas as building security capabilities of east African nations. 61 Also, the relationships that CJTF-HOA has established with local partners will facilitate future efforts to increase partner nations" law enforcement capabilities.
AFRICOM must address the seam in C2 of the Coalition task force, CTF 151.
Although AFRICOM may not need to take direct control of CTF 151, it must establish and maintain extensive communication with task force leadership in order to avoid gaps in unity of command and effort.
In order to expedite a counter-piracy focus, CJTF-HOA should transfer its current counter-extremism mission. AFRICOM already has another organization, OEF-TRANS SAHARA, which focuses on fighting terrorism in North and West Africa. 62 This transfer could reduce possible confusion in the mission areas of AFRICOM subordinate commands, and facilitate a more rapid application of effective counter-piracy measures.
